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Abstract: In the present uncertain context, increasing the performance of the supply chains requires to 
define cooperative processes between partners aiming at providing a better answer to the final customer, 
with a risk shared between partners. Based on an analysis of real practices, we suggest in this 
communication to take the MRP process as a basis for defining what could be such a cooperative process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the manufacturing companies are nowadays more and 
more focusing on their core processes, supply chains become 
larger and more complex structures which management has 
motivated a huge literature. Indeed, it is much more difficult 
to coordinate distant partners, who can have very different 
size and culture, than workshops belonging to the same plant. 
The growing uncertainty on the customers' demand makes 
this coordination still harder, and it is usually considered that 
an increased cooperation is a good way to mitigate the risks 
linked to this uncertainty (Hallikaset al., 2005). We suggest 
in this communication to use the MRP method as a basis for 
supporting a cooperative process aiming at a better 
synchronization of the partners, in a context of risk sharing. 
A short state of the art on collaborative processes in supply 
chains is given in section 2, whereas the main findings of a 
project aiming at analyzing real practices in supply chains of 
the aeronautic sector are summarized in section 3. In section 
4 are described some points on which a negotiation could be 
of mutual benefit for the partners, within a collaborative 
process. One of these negotiation processes is described with 
more details in section 5. 
2. COLLABORATION IN SUPPLY CHAINS 
Coordination, cooperation and collaboration are defined by 
several authors as increasing degrees of relationships between 
supply chain partners (see for instance (Camarinha-Matos et 
al., 2009)). Coordination of supply chain partners, which is 
the first condition for working together, may be achieved in a 
centralized or distributed way. In the first case, a dedicated 
software (Advanced Planning System - APS) is used to 
gather the information coming from each partner and suggest 
a planning including both manufacturing and transportation 
activities (Stadtler et al., 2007). This solution may allow an 
optimization of the global planning, but is poorly consistent 
with the autonomy of partners, who are usually independent 
companies. Therefore, supply chain planning is mainly 
achieved through local communication between a customer 
and his suppliers, as suggested in industrial reference models 
for supply chain management like SCOR (SCOR, 2008). In 
that case, planning is achieved using a cascade of MRP2 
(Manufacturing Resource Planning) modules (Orlicky et al., 
1994), as denoted in Fig. 1, taken from (Grabot et al., 2009): 
the final assembler collects forecasts, then defines a Sales and 
Operation Plan, usually referring to groups of products. He 
then builds a Master Production Schedule by product, and 
determines which components are required, by running the 
Material Requirement Planning module. The MRP step 
results in a production plan, allowing to build an internal load 
plan, and in a supply plan, sent to the suppliers. This supply 
plan, including a firm period (in which the orders cannot be 
modified) and a flexible period (in which changes may arise 
within given limits), is considered as forecasts by the 
suppliers. 
 
Fig. 1. Supply chain planning using a cascade of MRP 
processes (Grabot et al., 2009) 
Many parameters used in the MRP calculations, like the lead 
times, production and transportation lot sizes, etc., are 
defined in the contracts that link customer and supplier. 
 In order to be more reactive, new ways to collaborate on 
some specific aspects of the planning process have been 
defined in the last ten years, like Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) (VICS, 2011) or 
Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI) (Disney et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, these methods do not address the whole process 
described in Fig. 1. 
For academics, cooperation in supply chains is often 
considered as suppliers and buyers becoming strategic 
partners, sharing risks and benefits, exchanging operating and 
financial information, making joint investments in facilities 
and systems, jointly involved in continuous improvement and 
new product development programs, and making their 
success interdependent (Albino et al., 2007). Such 
cooperation is based on a “strategic partnership” sometimes 
called "cooperative SC relationship" (Ellram, 1991). In such 
business relationship, cooperation should start with joint 
planning and end with joint control activities to evaluate the 
performance of the supply chain members as well as the 
supply chain as a whole (Cooper et al., 1997; Tyndall et al. 
1998). Nevertheless, the reality of nowadays supply chains 
usually still shows more basic relationships: an intense 
upstream information flow can be noticed, in order to 
propagate the final customer's demand through the supply 
chain (see Fig. 1), but the downstream information flow is 
usually limited, each supplier having to answer to his local 
customer's demand by every mean. 
We have had the opportunity to analyse the behaviours 
resulting from such relationship in aeronautical supply chains 
of the south-west of France. Some findings of the study are 
summarized in next section. 
3. CASE STUDIES 
During the last few years, we have been involved in several 
projects aiming at analyzing or improving cooperation in 
supply chains, among which one performed with funding 
from an association of companies of the aeronautic sector and 
from a public body interested in SMEs (Small and Medium 
Enterprises) development. The objective of the project was to 
analyze the problems linked to the cooperation between 
partners of aeronautical supply chains, especially when SMEs 
were involved. Twenty companies were visited in that 
purpose: 7 large ones and 13 of middle (around 200 
employees) or low (less than 100 employees) size. If the 
relatively low number of the visited companies does not 
allow to fully guaranteeing the generality of the identified 
problems and situations, it is consistent with the results of 
previous projects on the same domain (Marcotte et al., 2009) 
and shows that some problems are not yet fully taken into 
account by present practices. 
Many problems linked to the real implementation of the 
previously described processes were identified during the 
interviews. We shall not give here an exhaustive list, but 
focus on some of them, which have influenced the rest of our 
study. 
3.1 Problems linked to the firm period of the forecasts 
The first issue identified during the interviews is that the size 
of the freezed period of the forecasts may be inconsistent 
with the supply lead times. As an example, a relative scarcity 
of some aeronautical alloys together with a lack of capacity 
of companies providing casting parts made that the supply 
time of some raw materials increased up to 12 months in 
some cases. In spite of this, the firm period of the forecasts 
sent by the customers to their suppliers remained constant, 
around 3 months, compelling the suppliers to take the risk to 
order materials on the base of flexible forecasts, or to take the 
risk to be late if they would wait for the corresponding orders 
to be confirmed.  
Example: A company manufacturing small (and highly 
customized) aircrafts has a firm horizon of 12 months, 
whereas its supply time for the motors is 14 months, the 
variant of the motor being chosen by the customer. 
3.2 Protection or pressure using the periods of the forecasts 
Some (rare) companies use the difference between the firm 
period received from their customers and the one they send to 
their suppliers as a way to protect their smallest partners, who 
may have difficulties for dealing with large variation of the 
demand.  
Example: A large tier 1 company mentioned that the 
importance of one his customers obliged him to accept that 
all orders could be cancelled until reception. However, the 
company did not set into question the firm horizon sent to his 
own suppliers, but introduced high flexibility ratios (±50%) 
in the flexible zone. In order to make this acceptable, they 
decided that if the ordered quantities decreased too much in 
this flexible period, they would commit to buy the parts by 
the end of the current year. 
3.3 Load smoothing at supplier's 
Load smoothing may be an important issue for SMEs, which 
have a limited capacity. During the periods when the load is 
important, some orders may have to be delayed while when 
the load is low, SMEs are looking for work in order to get 
minimum incomes. 
Example: A supplier explained that during a difficult period, 
he decided to work on orders belonging to the flexible period 
of the forecasts sent by his customer, even if he was not sure 
that these orders would be finally confirmed. For him, the 
risk was limited and the over cost linked to the late payment 
and increased inventories was lower than the cost required to 
temporarily decrease his capacity. 
3.4 Protection against variations of load 
Load smoothing can also be performed by the customer: 
some cases have been seen where this problem was formally 
taken into account by customers willing to protect their 
smallest suppliers. 
Example: A customer wanted to protect its smallest suppliers 
 from load variations. As a consequence, a maximum 
variation between two consecutive periods was considered as 
a constraint for building his supply plan. The consequence 
was that the customer had to anticipate any variation and to 
increase his inventory level in order to cope with the demand 
of his own customers, varying more dynamically. 
3.5 Link between price and cycle time 
Satisfying urgent orders is part of the daily work in 
aeronautical supply chains; it usually means to spend extra 
money (due to extra hours, etc.) or to postpone other orders 
considered as less urgent, creating perturbations in the 
planning. In some very specific cases, we have seen that the 
principle of a negotiation of the price and cycle time was 
considered in order to address the problem of these urgencies. 
Example: A company, who has a strong position because of 
the scarcity of his competence (surface treatment), managed 
to impose to its customers that only three cycle times were 
possible (10 days, 15 days, 20 days), with decreasing prices. 
Urgencies were only considered under condition that the 
customer was ready to pay for shorter cycle times. 
3.6 Information sharing 
As already stated, many SMEs are facing a variable demand, 
which they can hardly satisfy at low cost. Even if some 
orders are not as urgent as others, this information is often 
not communicated by the customer. As a consequence, the 
SMEs have to make their decisions, on the priority of orders, 
grouping of similar orders, adjustment of lot sizes etc., on the 
only base of internal considerations. In the case studies, we 
have nevertheless seen that some customers share 
information with their suppliers in order to allow them to 
make their decisions to the benefit of both partners. 
Example: A large company was sending the level of its 
present inventory together with each order, for showing his 
suppliers what could be the consequence of a tardy order. 
Sharing information on the inventory level gives to the 
supplier information on the customer’s priorities when it is 
necessary for him to postpone orders, and increases his 
flexibility when constraints occur locally.  
3.7 Lot sizes 
Lot sizes are an important item, negotiated in the contracts. 
Nevertheless, SMEs have to decrease their costs through 
time, and have so to find solutions for constantly increasing 
the efficiency of their production system. In order to do this, 
some of them may need to provisionally increase their lot 
sizes. Therefore, many suppliers tried to group several orders 
from their customers in order to decrease their set-ups. 
Example: An SME specialized in turning was exporting the 
planned orders to an Access® application aiming at grouping 
them according to the diameter of the parts, since this was not 
possible using their production management system. Since 
their application was not taking into account the due dates, 
the result was both early and late orders that were then 
negotiated individually with the customer. 
3.8 Conclusions of the study 
Nearly all the large companies consider that the process 
described in Fig. 1 is the only possible to efficiently manage 
a supply chain. Therefore, suppliers' behaviours that are not 
consistent with this framework are considered as a sign of 
poor maturity, with the result of many projects aiming at the 
so-called "supplier development" (Wen-Li, 2003). We 
suggest to have a different attitude, and to consider that the 
practices of the suppliers, even if they lead to problems, are 
the symptoms of real concerns. Therefore, we suggest to turn 
these "hidden" practices into public ones, subject to 
negotiation with the partner. In order to illustrate this, we 
have focussed on four points, which are detailed in next 
section. 
4. NEGOTIATION WITHIN THE MRP FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Period of forecast 
As mentioned previously, the forecasts in the aeronautical 
industry usually consist of firm, flexible and free periods. As 
seen during the interviews, practical issues concerning the 
periods of the forecasts are for instance the link between the 
firm period and the cycle time of the orders, or the link 
between the lengths of the periods received by the customer, 
and those he sends to his supplier. Therefore, we propose to 
put the periods of forecast into a middle term negotiation 
process, being defined on the base of the real requirements 
and actual necessities of both the customer and supplier.  
 
Fig. 2. Negotiation on the periods of forecast 
Fig. 2 presents the information flow between the different 
MRP steps and the negotiation activities concerning the 
periods of forecast. The information required for risks 
assessment is obtained, on the customer’s side, from a 
comparison between the results of the MRP calculation and 
the horizon from their own customer (right part of the figure). 
The same problem is detected by comparing the load 
planning and the forecasts sent by their customer on the 
supplier’s side (left part of the figure). Based on the results of 
risk assessment, negotiation of the periods of forecast may be 
 performed if the supplier or the customer considers the 
current risks as unacceptable.  
4.2 Load variation 
In case of load variation, instead of considering that the 
supplier HAS to answer to an overload if it is consistent with 
the contract, or CANNOT answer to an overload, we suggest 
that overloads (or lacks of loads) could also be negotiated, 
including setting into question the price paid by the customer.  
 
Fig. 3. Negotiation on the load variation  
Therefore, we suggest to negotiate load variation problems, 
either resulting from constraints at the supplier’s or 
customer’s side, with a direct link with the price (increase if 
the problem comes from the customer, decrease if the 
problem comes from the supplier). Fig. 3 presents the 
information flow during the negotiation on the load variation. 
On the customer’s side, information concerning the load 
variation is estimated at the MRP level, while real problems 
of capacity/load balance are usually detected in the S&OP 
and load planning level on the supplier’s side. According to 
their situations, the supplier and customer may both request a 
negotiation on the load variation.  
4.3 Prices and cycle time 
Urgencies are detected at the customer’s side, but when 
facing these urgencies, it is the supplier who is challenged 
through its flexibility and adjustment of capacity. 
We shall consider here that the cycle time of urgent orders is 
negotiable, as well as the price. When an urgent demand 
occurs, the customer should pay for the cycle time he expects 
according to the situation of his supplier; for instance, no 
increase of price would be required if the supplier is in an 
under loaded period. In other cases, a negotiation process on 
the price and cycle time is suggested to cope with the 
constraints coming from the supplier's capacity. 
Fig. 4 presents the information flow during the proposed 
negotiation on price and cycle time. On the customer’s side, 
the information for assessing the feasibility of an urgency is 
achieved at the MRP and load planning levels, while 
operational problems for dealing with such urgency come 
from the load planning and real-time scheduling level on the 
supplier’s side. The result of the negotiation should be a new 
price and due date after the negotiation. 
 
Fig. 4. Negotiation on price and cycle time  
4.4 Orders priority and Lot sizes 
The final item we suggest to put into the negotiation process 
is the orders priority and lot sizes. From the interviews, we 
have seen cases where SMEs try to regroup orders having 
common features, in order to decrease the set-up times by 
increasing the lot sizes. Without additional information from 
their customers, the suppliers use an internal priority for 
scheduling the orders at the operational level, if all the orders 
cannot be fulfilled in time, as well as when urgent orders are 
required. As a consequence, tardy orders towards one or 
several customers may occur. Temporal margins or safety 
stocks may allow the customer to face delayed delivery on 
some of the orders, but this information is not always shared 
with the suppliers.  
 
Fig. 5. Negotiation on priority and lot sizes 
We have chosen here to group these two issues in the same 
point (see Fig. 5), since they both deal with operational 
planning. We have seen that practices have been detected in 
our case studies aiming at decreasing this problem: see the 
large company sharing the information on his inventory, 
allowing its supplier to have a better vision of the real priority 
of the orders. This allows the supplier to make better 
decisions when it is necessary to postpone orders. We have 
also seen that minimum lot sizes can be agreed when the 
 contract is established. In order to go one step further, we 
suggest to include these points in a negotiation process, at 
middle term (lot sizes) then short term (priorities). Again, 
extra payment would be an element of the negotiation.  
Fig. 5 shows the information flow concerning the negotiation 
on priority and lot size. On the supplier’s side, lot sizes 
problems are detected at the MRP level, while the problems 
linked to priorities are detected at the load planning and real-
time scheduling levels. On the customer’s side, problems 
linked to the lot size considered as acceptable for their 
supplier ("estimated lot size" in Fig. 5) can be detected at the 
MPS level, according to the information produced in the 
MRP level. If the negotiation is performed, the customer 
could provide information about its internal priorities, which 
is usually hidden to the supplier, in order to reach mutual 
agreement.  
5. EXAMPLE OF NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
After having globally defined the modalities of negotiation, 
we have defined precise negotiation processes aiming at 
allowing a simulation, which would help us to identify the 
possible context of interest of such collaborative process. In 
that purpose, each negotiation process has been modeled 
using first the Business Process Diagram (BPMN, 2011).  
All the processes cannot be detailed here, but in Fig. 6 is 
shown the Business Process describing negotiation on 
periods of forecasts with more details. Normally, forecasts 
coming from customer’s customer are inputs of the S&OP 
plan, then used to generate the MPS (Master Production 
Schedule) (point !"#$"%#&'"(). The MPS sends more detailed 
requirements on material and production to the MRP 
(Material Requirement Planning) module (point )). The 
supply plan, an output of MRP, is generated based on the 
BOM (Bill Of Material), supply lead time, material inventory 
level, etc., according to the contractual time fences, including 
the firm, flexible and free periods (point *). 
 The supply plan is received by the supplier and considered as 
forecasts (point +). The supplier makes his own MRP 
calculation (point ,), resulting in his supply plan and load 
plan (point -). Since he has taken into account his cycle 
time and the cycle time of his suppliers, the supplier is able to 
see whether this load plan is consistent or not, or in other 
terms whether he takes too much risks (for instance by 
ordering parts on the base of the flexible period of forecasts, 
point .). Depending on the additional information on his 
customers and suppliers (such as: can they be urged or not, 
do they have financial stability or not), he decides whether 
these risks are acceptable or not (point /). If he considers 
that he takes more risks than his partners (customers and 
suppliers), he may ask for negotiation (point 0). 
The customer makes his own assessment of both internal 
risks and risks on supplier’s side (point 1). This assessment 
of course considers the horizon of the firm period received 
from his customer, the horizon of the firm period he sends to 
his suppliers, his internal cycle time, supplier’s cycle time, 
etc. It should also include his opinion on additional external 
information like cycle time from supplier’s suppliers, the real 
costs of his suppliers, etc. It is clear that this information is 
usually not provided by the supplier, who would not accept to 
communicate his real costs to his customer.  
The risk taken by the customer is in some way proportional 
to the difference between the horizon he receives and the 
horizon he sends. It can be different for each of his suppliers, 
since two different suppliers do not need the same protection, 
or in other words do not deserve that the customer takes the 
same risk. It is for instance acceptable to take risks for 
protecting a critical supplier, but not for a common one. Such 
assessment will provide a customer’s vision on the allocation 
of risks between the customer itself and his suppliers.  
The next step is to balance the customer’s and supplier's 
strength, aiming at identifying whether it could compensate 
the risks, and then assessing the acceptability of the risks 
taken by the customer (point 2). For instance, the customer 
may consider that he should take lower risks if his supplier 
has more “strength” than him. If, from customer’s vision, 
risks are not acceptable, he will request for negotiation (point 
3). Otherwise, the customer will accept the current plans 
(point 4).  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Even if local cooperative processes are already in use in 
supply chains, we do think that collaboration should be 
extended in order to increase the global performance of the 
supply chains. In that purpose, we suggest here to turn hidden 
practices, often creating more problems than they solve, into 
official ones, performed through negotiation. The goal is to 
finally obtain a real win-win relationship. Of course, 
negotiation processes like the ones suggested here are only 
possible in a climate of trust between partners, which is not 
always observed in reality. An analysis of this point can be 
found in (Ming et al., 2011). 
A second point is to demonstrate that these negotiation 
processes can really result in win-win situations. In order to 
validate this hypothesis, we have developed a simplified cost 
model which is the base of tests which are now in progress, 
aiming at better indentifying in which case negotiation on the 
suggested items can be of mutual benefit.  
As a third perspective, we would like to formalize with more 
details the notion of "risk" as considered here, which remains 
very subjective. In that purpose, we would like to better 
quantify the financial risks taken. This will require to use the 
cost model which is under development, but it will also 
necessitate to formalize more global issues allowing to assess 
the financial "health" of a company. 
Finally, we have begun to present this study to industrial 
partners in order to get their first comments. Indeed, this 
reaction has been more positive than expected: nearly all the 
companies consider that there is a real source of improvement 
in such methodologies, but all of them also agree on the 
difficulty to reach the situation of trust which is a pre-
requisite for it. 
   
 
Fig. 6. Business Process Diagram of period of forecast negotiation 
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